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Abstract: Proxy wars are a key pattern of political conflict and interstate competition. Rather 
than resorting to direct conflicts, which are costly and entail a higher level of uncertainty, 
governments may opt for proxy wars, which may last longer, but are less costly and render 
them more immune to exogenous shocks. We start with the modeling of a direct war with two 
players where a static equilibrium may be neither realizable nor sustainable in the long run. 
Then, we offer a model of proxy war where the proposed equilibria are realizable, but not 
always sustainable in the long run. The consolidation level of the double principal-agent 
relationship predicts the continuation of conflict and thus the emergence of peace.  
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I. Introduction 
Proxy wars have been a standard pattern of interstate competition and grand strategies of 
Great Powers. From the Vietnam War to the Afghanistan involvement, and from the Ukrainian 
conflict to the Syrian civil war, proxy wars have replaced direct military confrontations and at 
the same time have facilitated the emergence of protracted and oftentimes “frozen” conflicts. 
Powell (2013) argues that in a civil war context, the government’s decision to monopolize 
violence and consolidate power depends on the rebel opposition’s ability to resist the 
government’s “coercive power”, which reduces its payoff to fighting. Furthermore, he 
indicates that the size of “contingent spoils” is decisive for the method that the government 
chooses to consolidate power (Powell, 2013). When the spoils are large, then consolidation of 
power occurs through monopolization of violence; when the spoils are small, then the 
government buys off the rebels peacefully (ibid.). In another paper, Powell (2012) suggests that 
the persistence of fighting depends on the speed of power distribution. If the distribution of 
power occurs slowly or is stable, then fighting does not persist; however, if the distribution of 
power shifts rapidly, then fighting becomes more attractive (Powell, 2012). It is obvious that 
proxy wars can decelerate the shift in power distribution even more and in that way prevent 
the principals from starting a direct war with each other. Proxy wars reduce the total cost of 
conflict and, therefore, can perpetuate its existence in the long run. At the same time, agents 
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deviating from their equilibrium level of conflict involvement may lead one of the two 
principals to defeat and transition to a form of direct military confrontation.  
In this paper, we find that in direct wars (what we call a basic model of conflict – BMC) 
the realizability of equilibrium depends on whether both players have a starting level of 
conflict involvement that is strictly positive. Only under this condition is it possible to observe 
the emergence of an equilibrium. In the case that one player selects a negative starting level, 
an equilibrium is not realizable and therefore not observable. Furthermore, it needs to be 
pointed out that even the realizable equilibrium may not be sustainable in the long run if the 
distance between the conflict involvement levels of the two players becomes extremely high 
such that the player with the lower level of conflict involvement decides to exit the game.  
In our proposed model of proxy conflict (MPC), we argue that proxy conflicts allow 
the prevalence of negative differentials between the conflict involvement levels of principals 
and their respective agents. This either leads to the defeat of one principal against the other 
and therefore the imposition of a disproportional peace in favor of the other principal or it will 
facilitate a transition to a form of direct confrontation, both depending on the starting point of 
each principal’s conflict involvement level. Furthermore, when both principals and agents 
deliver positive levels of conflict involvement, the principals are likely to perpetuate the 
conflict; this equilibrium is both realizable and sustainable in the long run.  
Dunning (2011) proposes that armed conflict and electoral politics can be both strategic 
complements and strategic substitutes. Here, too, the distribution of popular support not only 
predicts the occurrence and type of armed conflict, but it may also create incentives of 
investment into institutional mechanisms, which may resolve commitment problems and 
facilitate peace (Dunning, 2011). The study of coups (Powell and Thyne, 2011) may explain 
why proxy conflicts are more efficient than direct confrontations: the ability of a principal to 
install his own agent into power reduces his own level of conflict involvement and brings 
about similar results in terms of power distribution.  
A characteristic feature of the second half of the twentieth century was the replacement 
of the old traditional forms of conflict resolution with new ones. By the end of the century, 
conflicts in the form of proxy wars had become predominant, and the term itself had become 
firmly entrenched in political discourse. At present, a proxy war is defined as a war that is 
carried out by someone else (through representatives) or a mediated war. It is very important 
here to distinguish between proxy wars as wars by representatives and wars run by coalitions 
that are composed by partners of different weight and influence. The history of the Thirty 
Years’ War (1618-1648) can be modeled as a proxy confrontation between France and the 
Habsburgs, where Denmark and Sweden were agents of France. Similarly, in the Hundred 
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Years’ War in Bretagne, feudal parties were oriented toward France (Maison de Blois) and 
England (Maison de Montfort). 
In our definition of proxy wars, we do not include conflicts in which small states have 
received significant external support from Great Powers or simply stronger states. 
Nevertheless, in the broad yet undefined category of proxy wars, a rising number of scholars 
include historical incidents such as the Spanish Civil War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, 
the Afghanistan War, the Civil War in Angola, and the events in Cambodia in the late 1970s. 
This also holds for modern conflicts such as the Syrian civil war and the Russian-Ukrainian 
confrontation in Donbass. A strong argument in favor of increasing the relevance of proxy 
conflicts is the rapid development of this phenomenon due to private military companies. The 
emergence of cyber wars and hacker attacks has led to these becoming relatively common in 
recent years and this is also related to proxy conflicts. However, the insufficient formal 
identification of an agent as such in cyberspace does not allow for direct inferences on that 
matter.  
Mumford (2013) provides interesting insights on conflict identification as proxy war. 
He analyzes a series of indicators according to which the conflict can be considered a proxy 
war, and in the absence of which a contrary conclusion can be made. He does not define 
conflicts where one of the principals interferes indirectly in the conflict (ibid.) as proxy wars. 
This is why, according to Mumford (2013), the Spanish Civil War and the War in Afghanistan 
cannot be classified as proxy wars. Eland (2002) provides a brief overview of US policy in 
Somalia through the lens of proxy wars. The advantages of proxy wars for the US are linked 
to efficiency gains because of an effective cooptation of local agents, which make up for the 
absence of a thorough understanding of local realities by the US themselves (ibid.). Sanders 
(2016) suggests that in norm proxy wars, norm challengers finance networks or localities of 
agents who contest human rights norms, usually in a transnational context. Biddle (2017) 
indicates that security force assistance, which is oftentimes provided by US administrations to 
allies that have weak state capacity, involves a principal-agent game where the higher the aid 
commitment on the part of the principal, the higher the degree of moral hazard that ensues. 
The launching of proxy wars requires the emergence of proxy dependencies between 
principals and agents. When one looks at executive politics and the US presidency, it becomes 
clear that experience in leadership cannot be substituted by the experience of presidential 
advisers when it comes to bias aggregation (Saunders, 2017). 
The paper has the following structure. In section II, we propose and solve a basic model 
of conflict (BMC) and a model of proxy conflict (MPC). Section III offers some baseline 
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simulations of our theoretical results. Section IV offers a concise discussion of the findings and 
concludes.    
 
II. The Model  
Preliminary observations & concepts 
Proxy war is a complex phenomenon. This determines the variability and ambiguity of the 
approaches and concepts of mathematical modeling that can be proposed for its description. 
At first, proxy wars can be modeled as preliminary training contests within which the main 
aim for the conflict parties is the exchange of information on levels of readiness for 
confrontation. In this setup, players exchange signals as to how far they are willing to go if the 
conflict follows the proxy path. A key concept for implementing this approach is dynamic 
Bayesian games and, in particular, signaling games. The main drawback of this approach is 
scalability. Indeed, it is very difficult to obtain convincing guarantees regarding the 
truthfulness of the signals sent. Quite reasonable is the question of what will make participants 
replicate their strategy in a full-scale conflict. Conversely, the bluff strategy is meaningful for 
the weaker side that intends to deter the opponent in the preliminary game with the threat of 
resistance and thus prevent his defeat in a full-scale conflict. 
Another concept treats proxy war as confrontation with a binary result. Here, victory 
becomes a priority for participants. With such an interpretation, the number of victories 
becomes the crucial criterion. The main idea proposed is to further models that offer and 
develop mathematical constructions explaining the objective necessity of a transition from 
direct confrontation to confrontation with the involvement of additional participants (agents). 
As is well known, in most of the games and competitive situations encountered in practice, 
the main element of participants' skills is their ability to find a strategy that opponents do not 
expect. The study of such “outcomes” obviously lies outside game theory per se, as it is 
meaningfully determined by the specifics of concrete games. The point is that, with a 
meaningful analysis of a particular game and the equilibria existing in it and on the basis of 
comparing them with the real properties of the modeled situation, we can evaluate the 
probability of identifying these equilibrium situations in reality.  
The improbability of such outcomes can be interpreted as an argument in favor of the 
hypothesis of “incompleteness” of the game description. It is reasonable to assume that players 
resort to some other actions that we do not consider in the initial model. We emphasize that 
we do not have the opportunity to “guess” their specific forms. However, at least there is a 
signal that such actions should be expected. The following models and methods of research 
on proxy wars to a large extent lie within the framework of this approach. In the case of 
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political and economic confrontation between individual countries (or country blocs), it is very 
difficult to formulate an exhaustive list of possible actions. Also, it is not realistic to imagine 
the possibility of drawing up all admissible configurations of involved allies and agents in the 
conflict. However, an objective justification of the appropriateness of including additional 
participants in the conflict itself is an important and constructive result. 
Basic Model: War Without Proxies 
We consider the following simplified model of bilateral conflict (from now on the BMC − Basic 
Model of Conflict). There are two players with the following utilities: 
 ( )111 1 2 1 1 2
2






for player 1, 
 ( )122 1 2 2 1 2
1






for player 2, 





is the result of the actions of player 𝑖𝑖 against player 𝑗𝑗, and parameter ℎ denotes the 
natural level of resistance to aggression – the conflict involvement of player 𝑖𝑖 cannot be 
infinitely large in the absolute absence of opposition from player 𝑗𝑗. The parameter 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 shows 
the comparability of measures of victory and defeat, and the coefficient α captures the non-
linear effect of damage on the scale expansion of conflict (in the basic setup we assume that 
this parameter is the same for both players). It is also important to point out that component 
( )1i i ja x x
α+
+  indicates the damage from conflict as the result of joint actions of participants. 
             The logic of the utility functions of both players allows the possibility that the 
quantities can take both negative and positive values. Positive 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is interpreted as the level of 
aggression (pressure on the opponent) in the conflict. Negative 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 can be interpreted as a 




and ( )1i i ja x x
α+
+ for 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0 is 
completely transparent, then for the case of negative arguments some additional explanations 
are required. Meaningful interpretations of the damage component, of course, assume the 
fulfillment of the condition 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥2 ≥ 0. If both sides make concessions, then conflict does not 
arise and, therefore, there is no damage from it. Strictly speaking, it would be more correct to 
define utility functions as follows: 
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 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� = � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗+ℎ − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�1+α, 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥2 ≥ 0,0, 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥2 < 0. (3) 
Furthermore, the search for the conditional extremum of the function 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� on some 
admissible area 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 × 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 leads to rather cumbersome mathematical derivations. Hence, we 
confine ourselves to the problems of conditional optimization, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�. In this case, solutions 
that go beyond the framework of the model (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≤ −ℎ), i.e. the level of concessions to the 
opponent beyond the natural resistance level h, can be interpreted as a conflict exit for this 
participant. An unambiguous interpretation of such an outcome as a defeat could not be 
entirely justified. It can mean that this player is inclined to radically change the conditions of 
conflict and move to a game with different rules and strategies. Figure 1 shows the effect of 
parameter α  on the functional dependency determining the utility of any player 𝑖𝑖. 
 
Figure 1: View of surface for function 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2) for different α values (𝑎𝑎1 = 1,𝑎𝑎2 = 2,ℎ = 0.7)  
Figure 2 shows the possible mutual disposition of the surfaces of players' utilities (with 
different coefficients of damage from conflict). 
 𝑥𝑥1 







α = 3 
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Figure 2: The surfaces for functions 𝑢𝑢1(𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥1), 𝑢𝑢2(𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥1) (𝑎𝑎1 = 1,𝑎𝑎2 = 2,ℎ = 0.7,α = 0.8), views 
from different angles 
We write down the necessary conditions of the stationary point (first-order condition) for the 





− 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ (1 + α) ∙ �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�α = 0 (4) 
or 
 (1 + α) ∙ �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�α = 1𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∙�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗+ℎ� = 1𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗∙(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖+ℎ). (5) 
As a result, we derive the expression for the best response of player i to a decision of player j: 
 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = � 1𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∙(1+α)∙�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗+ℎ��1α − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗. (6) 
It should be emphasized that the transition from (5) to (6) is mathematically correct if and only 
if the condition 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥1 ≥ 0 holds. From the condition 1𝑎𝑎2∙(𝑥𝑥1+ℎ) = 1𝑎𝑎1∙(𝑥𝑥2+ℎ)  or ( 𝑎𝑎2 ∙ (𝑥𝑥1 + ℎ) =
𝑎𝑎1 ∙ (𝑥𝑥2 + ℎ)  in (5) we derive the expression which sets the relationship between the best 
responses of both players: 
 𝑥𝑥1 = 𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2 ∙ 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑎𝑎1−𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎2 ∙ ℎ , 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎1 ∙ 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑎𝑎2−𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎1 ∙ ℎ . (7) 






∙ ℎ = � 1
𝑎𝑎1∙(1+α)∙(𝑥𝑥2∗+ℎ)�1α (8) 






∙ ℎ = � 1
𝑎𝑎2∙(1+α)∙(𝑥𝑥1∗+ℎ)�1α (9) 
(equation for 𝑥𝑥1∗). The solutions of the equations provide us with the components of the Nash 





Figure 3: Scenario 1 – Contentious Politics in the BMC, 𝑥𝑥1∗(𝑥𝑥2) > 0, 𝑥𝑥2∗(𝑥𝑥1) > 0 
Figures 3 and 4 present two possible scenarios related to the configurations of the best response 
curves. In the first case, at the Nash equilibrium point, a realistic confrontation in which 
players are inclined to adhere to certain positive levels of mutual pressure is observed. In the 
second case, the best response of player 1 turns out to be a negative value. To interpret such 
an observation as a plausible prediction of a real conflict is rather difficult. From this point of 
view, the equilibrium represented in Figure 4 can be characterized as unrealizable (in contrast 






∗(𝑥𝑥2) = � 1𝑎𝑎1 ∙ (1 + α) ∙ (𝑥𝑥2 + ℎ)�1α − 𝑥𝑥2 
(𝑥𝑥1∗, 𝑥𝑥2∗) 
𝑥𝑥2




Figure 4: Scenario 2 – Conflict transition in the BMC, 𝑥𝑥1∗(𝑥𝑥2) < 0, 𝑥𝑥2∗(𝑥𝑥1) > 0 
For definiteness, we assume that 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎2, i.e. the consequences (damage) from the conflict at 
the confrontation level 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥2 are more significant for player 2. This assumption, by way of 
the symmetry of the utility functions of participants, does not in any way reduce the level of 
generality of the subsequent conclusions. After transforming expression (9), which determines 
the value 𝑥𝑥1∗, we obtain: 
 * 2 1 11 1 1 1
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 . (10) 
Graphically, the solution of equation (10) can be represented as a result of the intersection of 







 (left-hand side) and hyperbolas 1 1 1 1
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(right-
hand side). These graphs are shown in figure 5. As can be seen from figure 5, equation (10) has 
a non-negative root if the point of intersection of the line specified by the left side of the 
equation with the ordinate axis lies below the intersection point of the hyperbola and the 
ordinate axis. Otherwise, equation (10) will have a negative root. As a result, from a 
comparison 2 1 1 1 1
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we obtain the following conditions: 
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∗(𝑥𝑥2) = � 1𝑎𝑎1 ∙ (1 + α) ∙ (𝑥𝑥2 + ℎ)�1α − 𝑥𝑥1 
(𝑥𝑥1∗, 𝑥𝑥2∗) 
𝑥𝑥2




∗ > 0   if   ℎ�1+1α� < 𝑎𝑎1(𝑎𝑎1+𝑎𝑎2)∙(1+α)1α∙𝑎𝑎21α .                                                                                           (12) 
 
Figure 5: Graphical solution of the equation determining 𝑥𝑥1∗ as a component of the equilibrium point 
We emphasize that for the correctness of conditions (11)-(12), the assumption 𝑎𝑎2 − 𝑎𝑎1 > 0 (𝑎𝑎2 > 𝑎𝑎1) is fundamental. If the condition of nonnegativity is controlled for the second 

















It is obvious that the left-hand side is always negative, and the right-hand side is always 
positive, which means that always 𝑥𝑥2∗ holds for 𝑎𝑎2 > 𝑎𝑎1. As an example, the calculation results 
for specific values of the parameters 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, ℎ and α are placed in Table 1. 
𝑥𝑥1
∗ < 0 𝑥𝑥1∗ > 0 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥1) 
𝑥𝑥1 
𝑎𝑎1(𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2) ∙ (1 + α)1α ∙ 𝑎𝑎21α ∙ 1(𝑥𝑥1∗ + ℎ)1α 
𝑥𝑥1
∗ + 𝑎𝑎2 − 𝑎𝑎1
𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2 ∙ ℎ 
𝑎𝑎2 − 𝑎𝑎1
𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2 ∙ ℎ 𝑎𝑎1(𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2) ∙ (1 + α)1α ∙ 𝑎𝑎21α ∙ ℎ1α 
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Table 1. The equilibrium points and values of the players' utilities in the BMC for different values of 
the parameters ℎ,𝛼𝛼. 
ℎ 0.5 0.7 
α 1 1.2 1.4 0.5 0.8 1 
𝑎𝑎1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
𝑎𝑎2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
𝑥𝑥1
∗ -0.000 0.005 0.009 -0.122 -0.105 -0.095 
𝑥𝑥2
∗ 0.500 0.510 0.519 0.455 0.490 0.509 
𝑢𝑢1(𝑥𝑥1∗, 𝑥𝑥2∗) -0.250 -0.227 -0.207 -0.298 -0.268 -0.250 
𝑢𝑢2(𝑥𝑥1∗, 𝑥𝑥2∗) 0.500 0.546 0.586 0.404 0.464 0.500 
Table 1 shows that an increase in the parameters h and α  leads to an increase in conflict 
participation levels in equilibrium. This result is not surprising, as both resistance to 
aggression and the non-linear magnitude of damage have a monotonically direct relationship 
with conflict expansion. Furthermore, it may also be the case that 1 2 .a a a= =  Hence, 















The value of expression (13) for small ℎ can be approximately estimated as 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ ≈
�2α ∙ �(1 + α) ∙ 𝑎𝑎��− 11+α. For example, when 𝑎𝑎 ≈ 1, 𝛼𝛼 ≈ 1, then 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ ≈ 0.5. The problem of 




Figure 6: A sequence of reciprocal best responses, starting point 𝑥𝑥1
(1) < 𝑥𝑥1∗ 
In Figure 6, there is the process of mutual reaction of conflict participants (the path of 
successive responses). This trajectory begins with the choice of participation level for the first 
player 𝑥𝑥1
(1). For this action, the second player chooses 𝑥𝑥2(1) = 𝑥𝑥2 �𝑥𝑥1(1)� in accordance with his 
best-response function. This is followed by the reaction of the first player 𝑥𝑥1
(2) = 𝑥𝑥1 �𝑥𝑥2(1)�. 
However, the sequence of reciprocal responses does not converge to equilibrium (𝑥𝑥1∗, 𝑥𝑥2∗). 
Thus, we may conclude its instability. The sequence of best responses in Figure 6 is 
characterized by an aggression containment by player 1: 
𝑥𝑥1
(1) > 𝑥𝑥1(2) > 0 > 𝑥𝑥1(3) 
and conversely, by an increase in the level of conflict involvement (and the cost of maintaining 













∗(𝑥𝑥2) = � 1𝑎𝑎1 ∙ (1 + α) ∙ (𝑥𝑥2 + ℎ)�1α − 𝑥𝑥1 
𝑥𝑥2
∗(𝑥𝑥1) = � 1𝑎𝑎2 ∙ (1 + α) ∙ (𝑥𝑥1 + ℎ)�1α − 𝑥𝑥1 




(3) < 0� must be at some “beyond” level, and then the “exit” of this player from the conflict 
follows. Another important property of the BMC is the dependence of the outcome on the 
choice of the “starting point” and its location relative to Nash equilibrium point. In the case 
just analyzed, it was 𝑥𝑥1
(1) < 𝑥𝑥1∗. 
 
Figure 7: A sequence of reciprocal best responses, starting point 𝑥𝑥1
(1) > 𝑥𝑥1∗ 
In Figure 7, there is a sequence of mutual best answers starting with 𝑥𝑥1
(1) > 𝑥𝑥1∗. In this case, the 
opposite is observed: there is a buildup of pressure by player 1 and a decrease in resistance by 
player 2. Consequently, player 2 is eliminated from the game. Similar reasoning can be 
introduced for variants of best response trajectories that start after the second player’s action. 
Even here identical conclusions could be obtained. From a mathematical standpoint, the 


















∗(𝑥𝑥2) = � 1𝑎𝑎1 ∙ (1 + α) ∙ (𝑥𝑥2 + ℎ)�1α − 𝑥𝑥1 
(𝑥𝑥1∗, 𝑥𝑥2∗) – Equilibrium Point 
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trajectories are determined by the ratio of the slopes of the best-response curves 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2(𝑥𝑥1) 𝑥𝑥1⁄  
and 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1(𝑥𝑥2) 𝑥𝑥2⁄ . However, the instability of equilibrium in the BMC should not be negatively 
interpreted. “Setting” the players' actions at the Nash equilibrium point means fixing the 
conflict for an extended period (in the context of comparative statics) while maintaining 
confrontation at equilibrium levels.  
            One of the most important characteristics of the BMC is an indicator reflecting the 
relative, “strength” of the player's response to his opponent's actions in the previous period 
𝑡𝑡 − 1: 
  (14) 
which is the response multiplier. From (14) we obtain the condition for reducing the reaction 
capacity 1 1( ) :t t ti j jx x x















− − + >
+
 . (15) 
Obviously, the opposite holds for increasing the reaction capacity of any of the two players to 
his opponent in the previous period 𝑡𝑡 − 1. 
 
Model of Proxy Conflict (MPC) 
We now assume that each participant of the previous model (BMC) can become a principal 
and therefore involve his own agent into the conflict. A schematic diagram of the model is 
shown in Figure 8. The key assumption in Figure 8 is that only a univocal relationship between 
the principal and the agent (𝑖𝑖 to 𝑖𝑖) is allowed. For a significant number of proxy war situations 
this univocal hypothesis is realistic. 
          We introduce 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  as the level of expenditures for principal 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2} so that the agent 𝑖𝑖 ∈{1,2} is also involved in the conflict. The principals take decisions on the levels of participation 
in the conflict (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), but they can delegate some of this level (“resource” for maintaining the 
conflict) to their agents. Thus, direct confrontation of agents occurs at 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ≥ −ℎ. The 
negativity of these values explains why the principal would give the agent a higher level of 
participation in the conflict than in the BMC. We underscore that the variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  reflects exactly 
the principal’s decision about the involvement of his agent. To denote the agent's solution (the 
actual participation of the agent in the conflict) we use the variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎. The difference in 
notation allows one to consider the potential inconsistency between the decisions of the 
principal and the agent. 
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         The principal’s utility in the MPC is as follows: 
 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗� = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖−𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗−𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗+ℎ + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗+ℎ − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗�1+α − 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∙ �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗�1+β. (16) 
Comments and explanations on the parameters of the formula (16) are given in Table (2). 
Table 2: MPC Parameters 
Variable Denotation 
( )0,1ib ∈  transformation coefficient (“price”) of expenditures (“investing”) in agent 
( )0,1ic ∈  coefficient ensuring comparability of measures of success (victory) in the BMC and 
the MPC 
0β >  exponent capturing the non-linear effect of damage on the scale expansion of conflict 
for agent i (equivalent of coefficient α) 
i ib a<  the negative effect of conflict on the principals’ payoffs is lower in proxy conflict 
β α<  the rate of increase of “cumulative” damage for principals is lower in proxy conflict 
The variables 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and α have the same content as in the previous model (BMC). It is impossible 
to draw unequivocal conclusions on parameter 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, which characterizes the relationship 
between the effects of direct and indirect participation in the conflict. Depending on the 
specificity of the simulated situation, they can be higher than, lower than or equal to 1. We 
define the utility function of agents in the standard form: 
 𝑢𝑢i𝑎𝑎�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎,𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎� = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎+h − 𝑑𝑑i ∙ �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎�1+γ. (17) 
The coefficient 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 in (17) is identical to the coefficients 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 in (16), and the coefficient γ 
identical to the coefficients α, β. In the general case, it is difficult to link γ to unidirectional 
relations with α or β. Of undoubted interest is the case γ = α , i.e. when the “cumulative” 
damage properties for the agent are identical to those for his principal. 
 
Figure 8: A scheme of interaction between participants in the MPC 
The condition for a stationary point (first-order condition) for the function 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� (player 𝑖𝑖 






− 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ (1 + α) ∙ �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗�α = 0 (18) 
Principal 1 (P–1) Principal 2 (P–2) 
Agent 1 (A–1) Agent 2 (A–2) 
𝑥𝑥1 − 𝑦𝑦1 




















+ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ (1 + α) ∙ �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗�α − 
 −𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∙ (1 + β) ∙ �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗�β = 0. (20) 
By considering (18), we derive the following condition: 
 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗+ℎ
= 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∙ (1 + β) ∙ �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗�β. (21) 
Similarly, with (6) from (19):  




− �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 − 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗�. (22) 
and from (21): 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖∙(1+β)∙�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗+ℎ��1β − 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗. (23) 
As we can see from the best-response functions for agents (21) and principals (19), an 
important and significant advantage of the MPC is the possibility of expressing the optimality 
condition via the differences (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) in a form similar to the optimality conditions for the 
BMC. This provides the option of comparing the conclusions obtained in both models, and, 
consequently, measuring the influence exerted by the agents (the proxy element of the 
conflict). Similarly to (8)−(9), we can write the equation which solves the equilibrium values 
of the direct participation levels of the principal proxy conflict: 
 𝑎𝑎1+𝑎𝑎2
𝑎𝑎1
∙ (𝑥𝑥1∗ − 𝑦𝑦1∗) + 𝑎𝑎2−𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎1 ∙ ℎ = � 1𝑎𝑎2∙(1+α)∙�(𝑥𝑥1∗−𝑦𝑦1∗)+ℎ��1α (24) 
(equation for (𝑥𝑥1∗ − 𝑦𝑦1∗)), 
 𝑎𝑎1+𝑎𝑎2
𝑎𝑎2
∙ (𝑥𝑥2∗ − 𝑦𝑦2∗) + 𝑎𝑎1−𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎2 ∙ ℎ = � 1𝑎𝑎1∙(1+α)∙�(𝑥𝑥2∗−𝑦𝑦2∗)+ℎ��1α (25) 
(equation for (𝑥𝑥2∗ − 𝑦𝑦2∗)). 
Similarly, equations are obtained to identify the equilibrium levels of attracting agents to the 






∙ ℎ = � 𝑐𝑐2
𝑏𝑏2∙(1+β)∙(𝑦𝑦1∗+ℎ)�1β (26) 






∙ ℎ = � 𝑐𝑐1
𝑏𝑏1∙(1+β)∙(𝑦𝑦2∗+ℎ)�1β (27) 
(equation for 𝑦𝑦2∗). 
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              Finding equilibrium solutions without taking into account the intrinsic utility of 
agents implies a consistent solution of equations (26) then (24), and (27) then (25). The main 
advantage of the MPC is that it allows us to reasonably analyze a conflict situation when there 
are negative components defining the equilibrium point. Indeed, the difference 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ can 
also be negative in the case when 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 0, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 0, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗. This suggests the emergence of an 
equilibrium in which the agent is delegated a greater share of responsibility for maintaining 
the conflict than the principal himself. Similar situations correspond to stable (protracted) 
proxy wars. It may be the case that without agent participation equilibrium assumes 
asymmetric concessions of one side (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗) under the pressure of the other �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗∗�. This property of 
the MPC can be considered as a reliable and plausible explanation of the determinants of proxy 
wars. 
             An example of a constructive implementation of a problematic (asymmetric in pressure 
and concessions) equilibrium is given in Table 3. To preserve the continuity of examples, the 
situation that arose in the BMC was chosen (for 𝑎𝑎1 = 1, 𝑎𝑎2 = 2, ℎ = 0.7, α = 0.8, see Table 1). 
In this case, at the equilibrium point, player 2 must maintain a positive level of participation 
in the conflict (0.490), but player 1, in contrast, makes concessions (−0.105). In the case of a 
conflict transformation from direct confrontation to a proxy war (with the same values of ℎ 
and α) an equilibrium arises in the MPC, in which principal 1 together with his agent can 
maintain a positive level of confrontation. At the chosen values of parameters, the utility of 
principal 1 in the MPC is less than the value of player 1's utility in the BMC (−0.455 < −0.268). 
This observation is in line with the objective properties of conflicts. Involvement of additional 
participants (agents) in the conflict helps maintain a “moderate” level of confrontation (due 
level of conflict participation), but this undoubtedly requires additional costs. 
            In accordance with the equilibrium presented in Table 3, when there is a proxy conflict, 
the agent's involvement becomes useful not only for player 1 but also for player 2, despite his 
positive level of participation in the BMC equilibrium. The utility of player 2 in the case of a 
proxy conflict increases compared to his utility in the baseline model (0.477 > 0.464). 
Table 3 Constructive implementation of an equilibrium: negative best response by player 1 






1 0.7 0.8 0.5 1 0.8 1 −0.105 0.074 0.178 −0.455 2 2 0.8 0.8 0.490 0.888 0.398 0.477 
At the same time, the MPC properties do not exclude the possibility of equilibrium existence 
when 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ are negative. Proxy conflict can be considered as a mechanism for 
implementing equilibrium in situations with “bad” asymmetries in terms of balance of power 
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and one-sided concessions.3 The conditions determining the sign of equilibrium levels of direct 
participation for principals are completely identical to condition (11). As before, without loss 
of generality we can assume that 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎2. Hence, the conditions for 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ are the following:  
 𝑦𝑦1∗ > 0    if   ��ℎ�1+1β� < 𝑏𝑏1∙𝑐𝑐2(𝑏𝑏2∙𝑐𝑐1−𝑏𝑏1∙𝑐𝑐2)∙(1+β)1β∙𝑏𝑏21β�   ⋀   (𝑏𝑏2 ∙ 𝑐𝑐1 > 𝑏𝑏1 ∙ 𝑐𝑐2) ,
𝑏𝑏2 ∙ 𝑐𝑐1 ≤ 𝑏𝑏1 ∙ 𝑐𝑐2
 (28) 
 𝑦𝑦2∗ > 0    if   ��ℎ�1+1β� < 𝑏𝑏2∙𝑐𝑐1(𝑏𝑏1∙𝑐𝑐2−𝑏𝑏2∙𝑐𝑐1)∙(1+β)1β∙𝑏𝑏11β�   ⋀   (𝑏𝑏1 ∙ 𝑐𝑐2 > 𝑏𝑏2 ∙ 𝑐𝑐1) ,
𝑏𝑏1 ∙ 𝑐𝑐2 ≤ 𝑏𝑏2 ∙ 𝑐𝑐1
 (29) 
It is necessary to indicate that equilibrium deviations of players within the framework of proxy 
conflicts (as well as in the BMC) can lead to different scenarios for their development. 
 
III. Simulations  
Of fundamental importance is the problem of equilibrium consistency from the perspective of 
principals and their preferred levels of agent involvement in the conflict (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗) as well as the 
values of 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎, which solve the problem of utility maximization of agents determined by 
functions (17). Computational simulation experiments in which potential successive path 
trajectories can be identified are of major interest for understanding the nature of the proposed 
proxy conflicts. To begin with, we analyze situations in which agents in the first period deviate 
from equilibrium defined by equations (24)−(27), i.e. the “principal equilibrium”, and select 
their optimal levels of participation in the conflict to be 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎. Over the next periods, we assume 
that the principals have enough “influence” on their agents to force them to act in accordance 
with the levels of participation 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
∗ dictated by them. Based on the properties of the MPC, the 
mutual arrangement of the points �𝑦𝑦1∗ ,𝑦𝑦2∗� and (�𝑦𝑦�1𝑎𝑎,𝑦𝑦�2𝑎𝑎� is of central importance for the 
simulation experiment outcomes (see Figure 9).  
                                                          





Figure 9: Mutual arrangement of the points �𝑦𝑦1∗ ,𝑦𝑦2∗� and (�𝑦𝑦�1𝑎𝑎,𝑦𝑦�2𝑎𝑎�, 𝜀𝜀 > 0 
Table 3 contains the values of the mutual best responses of the principals and agents under the 
assumption that both agents deviate from the equilibrium values �𝑦𝑦1∗ ,𝑦𝑦2∗� in the direction of 
decreasing (reducing the tension of the conflict) 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ + ε𝑖𝑖 , 
where ε1 = ε2 = 0.1 (variant (c), in accordance with the classification of Figure 9). The values 
of the equilibrium point ��𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗��𝑖𝑖=1,2 are calculated from the data in Table 3. 
Table 4: Trajectory of mutual best responses by MPC participations: agents already reject their 
conflict involvement levels at the beginning 
𝑡𝑡 










∗ 𝑦𝑦2∗ 𝑢𝑢2∗(∘) 
Equilibrium -0,105 0,074 0,178 -0,455 0,490 0,888 0,398 0,477 
0 -0,105 0,064 0,168 -0,445 0,490 0,878 0,388 0,490 
1 -0,105 0,094 0,199 -0,481 0,490 0,912 0,421 0,448 
2 -0,105 0,026 0,131 -0,573 0,490 1,003 0,512 0,544 
3 -0,105 -0,144 -0,039 -1,113 0,490 1,548 1,058 0,923 
4 -0,105 -0,700 -0,833 − 0,490 -0,700 -0,700 − 
          The mutual best responses of the conflict participants are computed based on the 
assumption that at the start point the agents deviate from equilibrium, while the principal acts 
in accordance with the logic 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0 = �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗� + 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 and then follows a series of consecutive 
mutual best responses to the opponent's actions in the previous period. As the data in Table 4 
indicates, the series of mutual best responses is characterized by successive weakening of side 
1 (both principal and agent) and their “exit from the game” at the fourth period. Figure 10 




�𝑦𝑦1∗ − ε,𝑦𝑦2∗ + ε� �𝑦𝑦1∗ + ε,𝑦𝑦2∗ + ε� 





Figure 10: Dynamics of successive mutual best answers of participants (agents deviate at the 
beginning of the first period such that 𝜀𝜀 = 0.1) 
 
 
The mutual relationship of the participants’ best responses are depicted in Figure 9. 
Each point corresponds to the selection of each conflict party (the principal plus his agent). On 
the abscissa axis, the selections of conflict involvement levels by the principals are laid out, 
while along the ordinates are those of the agents. 
Figure 11: Trajectory of consecutive mutual best responses of participants in a proxy conflict 
�𝑥𝑥1∗ ,𝑦𝑦1∗�, �𝑥𝑥2∗ ,𝑦𝑦2∗� 
 
 
Figure 12: Trajectory of the utilities of principals in a proxy conflict given their mutual consecutive 






Figure 12 depicts the payoff dynamics of the principals in the process of conflict. The 
abscissa axis corresponds to the utility of principal 1, the ordinate axis to the utility of principal 
2. The graphs of mutual best response trajectories determined by the conditions (26)-(27) for 
the MPC are presented in the Appendix (see below).4 Simulation procedures allow us to obtain 
interesting and informative results about the development of proxy conflicts. We can assess 
the consequences for principals when agents independently select their level of involvement 
in the conflict. The significance of the model proposed in this paper is that it shows the cardinal 
importance for the principal of the choice of such an agent who has an objective self-interest 
in participating in the conflict exactly at the level which corresponds to his own equilibrium 
condition (26)-(27). Otherwise, a mutual best-response trajectory arises that does not converge 
to equilibrium and leads to the retirement of one of the parties from the conflict. 
Another important feature of this model is its ability to question the effectiveness of 
contemporary peace-making processes, by suggesting that a simultaneous reduction in the 
levels of confrontation will only have short-term effects on conflict resolution. As discussed 
above, a trajectory that starts with a simultaneous decrease in the deviation of agents from 
equilibrium levels leads to a gradual surrender of positions by principal 1 and, ultimately, his 
exit from the conflict. This outcome can be interpreted either as defeat for principal 1 or as a 
costly transition to another form of direct or indirect confrontation. Therefore, proxy conflicts are 
much more likely to persist than direct conflicts. Extensions of our model may include Bayesian 
games. Informational asymmetry may be related to the incompleteness of the principal’s 
knowledge about the true levels of the agent’s conflict involvement.  
 
                                                          







IV. Discussion  
Proxy wars reveal the contradictory nature of retaliatory strike and of symmetric peace-
making processes. In the case of retaliatory strike, for principal payoffs structurally identical 
to functional dependencies, the more reactive sequences of mutual best responses inevitably 
lead conflict participants away from the equilibrium point. This observation suggests, on the 
one hand, an unstable evolutionary path and, on the other hand, a possible instrument for 
conflict resolution. At the same time, the simultaneous reduction of conflict involvement for 
agents may lead one of the two parties to exit from the conflict, which may be desirable in the 
short run, but it is uncertain whether it will produce a long-lasting peace.  
There are several extensions to be proposed based on our Model of Proxy Conflict (MPC). 
First, the interaction scheme between principals and agents may differ, including asymmetric 
derivations with two principals and three agents. Moreover, the same participant under 
different conditions may be an agent of different principals (the problem of the unprincipled 
ally or so-called “Myrmidon problem”). It can also be the case that there is a high degree of 
the principal’s dependence on the agent if the latter uses feedback strategies (the so-called 
North Korea problem). Finally, cooperative game-theoretic models underscore the 
significance of coalition configurations between agents and principals. It is also possible to 
consider the introduction of constraints on the participants’ resources, both principals’ and 
agents’. In our paper, the absence of resource constraints is partially compensated for by the 
effect of the “damage” component in the participants’ respective payoffs.  It is, therefore, 
necessary to suggest that from the point of view of mathematical and computational methods 
the models proposed in this paper are very close to the methodology of penalty functions that 
are widely used in solving optimization problems in the fields of engineering and natural 
sciences.  
What needs to be pointed out here is the importance of randomization processes for 
the predictive power of proxy war modeling. Randomization primarily involves the choice of 
“starting” points in the simulation of consecutive mutual best responses. As has already been 
mentioned above, the evolution of best-response trajectories within the framework of the BMC 
and the MPC depends on the mutual location of the starting point of each trajectory and the 
equilibrium point. This is why it can lead to radically different outcomes. Nevertheless, in the 
case of asymmetric information (the players do not have knowledge about the parameters of 
the utility function of each other), the choice of a starting point of conflict involvement becomes 
more complex. We are convinced that the inclusion of incomplete information and stochastic 
processes can significantly increase their validity in the long run. What we underscore in our 
theory of proxy wars is that they can facilitate efficient victories for principals compared to 
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direct confrontation. Nevertheless, high levels of deviations by the appointed agents may 
speed up the principal’s exit from the conflict either in the form of defeat or transition to a 
costly direct confrontation. Hence, agents are not blind executors of the principals’ will, but 
they are drawn by them to participate in the conflict, while preserving their own system of 
incentives and interests. The success of the principals’ actions depends to a large extent on 
their ability to harmonize their own interests with the respective goals of their selected agents. 
References 
Biddle S., 2017. Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency. 
Daedalus, Vol. 146, No. 4 (Fall): 126-138. 
Dunning, T., 2011. Fighting and Voting: Violent Conflict and Electoral Politics. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 55, No. 3 (March): 327-339. 
Eland, I. “Turn the War on Terrorism Into a War by Proxy.” Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 
January 23, 2002. 
Mumford, A., 2013. Proxy Warfare. Polity Press, Cambridge, England, and Malden, MA.  
Powell, J.M. and C.L. Thyne, 2011. Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset. 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 48, No. 2 (March): 249-259. 
Powell, R., 2012. Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power. American Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 56, No. 3 (July): 620-637. 
Powell, R., 2013. Monopolizing Violence and Consolidating Power. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 128, No. 2 (May): 807-859.  
Sanders, R., 2016. Norm Proxy War and Resistance Through Outsourcing: The Dynamics of 
Transnational Human Rights Contestation. Human Rights Review, Vol. 17 (January): 165-
191. 
Saunders, E.N., 2017. No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers and Information in 
Group Decision-Making. International Organization, Vol. 71: 219-247. 
 
Appendix 
Table 5: Trajectory of mutual best responses of proxy conflict participants – scenario 1 (agents deviate 
at the starting point) 
𝑡𝑡 










∗ 𝑦𝑦2∗ 𝑢𝑢2∗(∘) 
Equilibrium -0,105 0,074 0,178 -0,455 0,490 0,888 0,398 0,477 
0 -0,105 0,084 0,188 -0,466 0,490 0,898 0,408 0,463 
1 -0,105 0,053 0,158 -0,432 0,490 0,865 0,375 0,502 
2 -0,105 0,121 0,226 -0,339 0,490 0,783 0,292 0,418 
3 -0,105 0,308 0,413 0,199 0,490 0,436 -0,054 0,253 







Figure 13: Dynamics of successive mutual best responses of proxy conflict participants – scenario 1 




Table 6: Trajectory of mutual best responses of proxy conflict participants – scenario 2 (agents 
deviate at the starting point) 
𝑡𝑡 










∗ 𝑦𝑦2∗ 𝑢𝑢2∗(∘) 
Equilibrium -0,105 0,074 0,178 -0,455 0,490 0,888 0,398 0,477 
0 -0,105 0,064 0,168 -0,466 0,490 0,898 0,408 0,490 
1 -0,105 0,053 0,158 -0,480 0,490 0,912 0,421 0,504 
2 -0,105 0,026 0,131 -0,573 0,490 1,003 0,512 0,544 
3 -0,105 -0,144 -0,039 -1,113 0,490 1,548 1,058 0,923 
4 -0,105 -0,700 -0,833 − 0,490 -0,700 -0,700 − 
 
Figure 14: Dynamics of successive mutual best responses of proxy conflict participants – scenario 2 




Table 7: Trajectory of mutual best responses of proxy conflict participants – scenario 3 (agents 
deviate at the starting point) 
𝑡𝑡 










∗ 𝑦𝑦2∗ 𝑢𝑢2∗(∘) 
Equilibrium -0,105 0,074 0,178 -0,455 0,490 0,888 0,398 0,477 
0 -0,105 0,084 0,188 -0,445 0,490 0,878 0,388 0,463 
1 -0,105 0,094 0,199 -0,431 0,490 0,865 0,375 0,450 
2 -0,105 0,121 0,226 -0,339 0,490 0,783 0,292 0,418 
3 -0,105 0,308 0,413 0,199 0,490 0,436 -0,054 0,253 
4 -0,105 1,614 1,719 -2,108 0,490 -0,700 -1,643 -0,096 
 
Figure 15: Dynamics of successive mutual best responses of proxy conflict participants – scenario 3 
(agents deviate at the starting point 𝜀𝜀 = 0.1) 
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